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Abstract This paper investigates different modes of
organizing for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based
on insights from organization theory, we theorize two ways
to organize for CSR. ‘‘Complete’’ organization for CSR
happens within businesses and depends on the availability
of certain organizational elements (e.g., membership,
hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctioning). By contrast,
‘‘partial’’ organization for CSR happens when organizers
do not have direct access to all these organizational ele-
ments. We discuss partial organization for CSR by ana-
lyzing how standards and cross-sector partnerships make
selective use of organizational elements. We maintain that
an important feature of the increasing institutionalization of
CSR—not only within businesses but also among non-
governmental, governmental, and professional actors—is
the rise of partial forms of organization. We discuss the
contributions to this Special Issue in the context of our
theorization of complete/partial organization for CSR and
outline avenues for further research.
Keywords Organization studies  Corporate social
responsibility  CSR standards  Cross-sector
partnerships  Partial organization  Institutional
theory  Complete organization
Introduction
How is corporate social responsibility (CSR) organized?
Why are certain organizational forms used frequently to
coordinate CSR activities, while other forms are less
widespread? Students of CSR and organization studies
rarely address such questions despite the emergence of
CSR as an academic field (de Bakker et al. 2005; Lockett
et al. 2006). A lot is known about CSR, particularly of
multinational corporations (MNCs) (Maignan and Ralston
2002; Chapple and Moon 2005); the business benefits of
CSR (Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Carroll and Shabana
2010); civil society involvement (den Hond and de Bakker
2007); as well as the politicization of CSR (Moon et al.
2004; Scherer and Palazzo 2011) and its links with glob-
alization (Gilbert et al. 2011). However, CSR scholars have
tended to overlook, or take for granted, the respective
organizational components of these developments.
The CSR literature is now well-stocked with studies of
particular initiatives such as cross-sector partnerships,
codes of conduct, and multi-stakeholder standards. How-
ever, the elements that enable and constrain these orga-
nized orders are rarely considered. For instance, some
types of organizing for CSR make explicit reference to
hierarchy by obliging others to comply with central deci-
sions (e.g., when a firm introduces a code of conduct),
while other types of organizing for CSR neglect hierar-
chical steering (e.g., when corporations and NGOs enter
into partnerships). Few scholars have looked into why,
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when, and how certain organizational elements like hier-
archy are used to coordinate CSR-related activities within
and among organizations.
We argue that there is value in examining the organiza-
tional features of CSR developments more closely. After all,
businesses address social and environmental issues through
different types of organizing (Husted 2003). For instance,
firms can promote human rights through in-house projects,
partnership agreements, or by signing up to industry-wide
standards (Abbott 2012). When and why are certain types of
organizing for CSR preferable to other types? On what
grounds do actors decide how to organize for CSR in a given
situation? While we do not claim to have conclusive answers
to these questions, in this paper we offer a theoretical
framework, based on insights from organization theory, to
approach this discussion systematically.
Our argument takes as a starting point Ahrne and
Brunsson’s (2011) recent claim that the concept of orga-
nization can be better understood once the organizational
elements that are needed to achieve organized orders are
unpacked: i.e., membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring,
and sanctioning. Whereas formal organizations typically
have access to all these elements, other types of organizing
only use selected elements. Drawing on these ideas, we
argue that two types of organizing for CSR stand out. First,
CSR can be organized through ‘‘complete’’ organization in
businesses such as in MNCs and small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). In such cases, organizers usually have
access to all organizational elements, although the way in
which these elements are operationalized may differ in
style among larger corporations and SMEs. Second, CSR
can be organized through ‘‘partial’’ organization, such as
CSR standards (e.g., the Forest Stewardship Council) and
partnerships (e.g., between NGOs and corporations). In
these cases, organizers do not have access to all organi-
zational elements. When discussing complete/partial
organization for CSR, we refer to the process of applying
and mixing different organizational elements while orga-
nizing for CSR.
This paper suggests, first, that it is necessary to analyt-
ically distinguish these two types of organizing for CSR.
Second, we argue that being selective among the organi-
zational elements available, can be advantageous for CSR
organizers (e.g., in terms of reduced costs), but can also
create challenges for managing CSR (e.g., in terms of
missing accountability). Third, the paper reveals how the
focus upon organizing for CSR, whether inside or outside
formal organizations, complements other theoretical
approaches in the field. In particular, it relates the theory of
‘‘organizing’’ to institutional theory which has recently
seen some shift toward interaction dynamics in multi-
institutional systems (Thornton et al. 2012), including
between social movements, civil society, and corporations
(de Bakker et al. 2013). Fourth, we argue that the rise of
partial modes of organizing for CSR has been part of a
more general shift from CSR being ‘‘corporate-centered’’
to a more ‘‘corporate-oriented’’ understanding. On the basis
of these four contributions, we argue that a new direction
of CSR research emerges, a direction that puts more
emphasis on how CSR organizers (e.g., firms, NGOs,
standard-setters, governments) (re-)combine different
organizational elements to achieve their goals.
This paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we
introduce the theoretical background of the overall argu-
ment by revisiting relevant theoretical frameworks in
organization studies. The following section introduces two
different ways of organizing for CSR, distinguishing
between ‘‘complete’’ organization and ‘‘partial’’ organiza-
tion. We provide a variety of examples of how both forms
of organizing create opportunities and problems for CSR.
The next section outlines new avenues for research at the
intersection of organization theory and CSR by introducing
the papers in this Special Issue. In the concluding section,
we briefly outline an agenda for future research in this area.
Theoretical Background
Complete and Partial Organization
When reflecting on how something is organized, it makes
sense to distinguish between ‘‘the organized’’ and the
‘‘non-organized’’. What criteria enable this distinction?
According to Ahrne and Brunsson (2011), organization can
be understood as a type of decided social order in which
one or more of the following elements exist: membership,
hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions. Our analysis of
organizing for CSR is based on a discussion of these five
organizational elements.
Traditionally, scholars have focused on organizing that
happens within the boundaries of formal organizations
(Etzioni 1964; March and Simon 1958; Mintzberg 1979;
Weick 1979). Formal organizations possess all five ele-
ments and thus can be characterized as ‘‘complete’’ orga-
nizations. For instance, formal organizations decide about
who can and cannot join the organization (e.g., as an
employee) and thus constitute their membership. They also
assign decision-making authority to certain individuals or
groups of individuals and hence include some form of
hierarchy (Child 2005). Formal organizations also coordi-
nate their activities by issuing rules that members are
expected to follow and establish formal or informal mon-
itoring mechanisms to ensure rule compliance (Weber
1968). Finally, formal organizations contain positive and
negative sanctioning mechanisms, both of which reflect an
additional way to enforce relevant rules. Of course, the
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extent to which these five elements are deployed in any
formal organization, and their overall balance therein,
remain empirical questions. What is important for our
analysis is that formal organizations by definition can draw
on all five elements to create a decided order (Ahrne and
Brunsson 2011; Brunsson 2006). Even if they choose not to
draw upon all elements for a particular organizational task,
the latent possession of the full range of elements consti-
tutes the distinguishing feature of complete organization.
However, not all organization takes place within the
boundaries of formal organizations. Organization also
occurs when one or several of the described elements of
formal organizations are missing. Ahrne and Brunsson
(2011, p. 84) make exactly this point when arguing that
‘‘[w]e can find organization not only within, but also out-
side and among formal organizations.’’ For instance, for-
mal organizations can organize other organizations (e.g.,
associations), and the environment of formal organizations
can also contain elements of organization (e.g., when
looking at standards that are adopted by different organi-
zations). Hence, it is possible to distinguish two types of
organization: ‘‘complete’’ formal organizations (i.e., orga-
nizations containing all of the elements constitutive of
organization) and ‘‘partial’’ organization (i.e., those forms
of organization that only use selected elements). Partial
organization comes in different forms. For instance, rank-
ings of business schools reflect one form of partial orga-
nization. While rankings monitor schools’ behavior, have
sanctioning effects and are based on explicit rules (Sauder
and Espeland 2009), they do not necessarily organize
through membership or hierarchical control. Associations
reflect another type of partial organization. While they
organize through membership and also specify certain rules
that members need to adhere to, they usually do not
monitor or sanction members’ behavior (Coleman 1997).
Recognizing that organization can stretch beyond the
boundaries of formal organizations throws up the question
of how organization is different from two other prominent
concepts in organization studies: networks and institutions.
While Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) realize that networks
and institutions can be defined in broad terms making it
hard to distinguish them from organization, they also point
to an important difference. Networks and institutions
constitute emergent social orders. Institutions emerge
through habituation of interactions (Berger and Luckmann
1966) and are ‘‘stable, valued recurring patterns of
behavior’’ whose levels of institutionalization reflect their
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence (Hun-
tington 1968, p. 12). Likewise, social networks develop
gradually and depend on mutual trust (Granovetter 1973).
By contrast, organization, whether partial or complete,
is the result of deliberate decisions by individuals or by
other organizations (e.g., when deciding to introduce an
ethical supply system).1 The fact that organization is the
result of deliberate decisions has a variety of implications.
For instance, whereas institutions are usually not ques-
tioned, as they reflect taken-for-granted patterns of
behavior, organized orders can be challenged more easily
due to the explicit nature of the underlying decisions.
Furthermore, since deliberate decisions emphasize human
control (as they are the outcome of individuals’ prefer-
ences), responsibility is easier to assign when looking at
organized orders. By contrast, in emergent orders respon-
sibility is less concentrated around individual decisions and
hence more dispersed and diluted (Ahrne and Brunsson
2011, p. 91).
Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR has been described as an ‘‘essentially contested’’
concept which means that even its adherents may disagree
as to its scope and application (Gond and Moon 2011). As
various surveys of the field have revealed, there have been
numerous different theoretical orientations for CSR, such
as the instrumental, the political, the integrative (or
stakeholder), and the ethical approaches (Garriga and Mele´
2004; de Bakker et al. 2005). There have also been a
number of disputes in understanding CSR, particularly
concerning its relationship with profit making, with the
law, and with government policy.
Tracing CSR as a coherent management concept and as
an academic field therefore is a somewhat fraught exercise.
The 2011 European Commission (2011, p. 6) definition
captures its essence: ‘‘the responsibility of enterprises for
their impacts on society.’’ However, CSR has varied enor-
mously by context, particularly the context of place, or
national business systems (Matten and Moon 2008). More-
over, the most important characteristic to note in CSR is its
susceptibility to change (Gond and Moon 2011). Change has
been evident through variations in: the relative significance
of Garriga and Mele´’s (2004) theoretical positions on CSR;
the balance of importance attached to the different levels of
responsibility in Carroll’s (1979) CSR pyramid; the variable
prioritization of particular stakeholders (be they society,
investors, consumers, employees—including those in sup-
ply chain companies); and the balance of social, economic,
1 We are aware that not all scholars would agree to describe
institutions as emergent social orders. Peters (1999, p. 18), for
instance, understands institutions as ‘‘structural features of the
society/polity,’’ which also includes deliberately created elements
such as legislatures. Meanwhile, some networks are also deliberately
organized—think of networks of NGOs working in a specific
campaign (de Bakker 2012). It is important to note in this context
that Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) argue that in genuine networks and
institutions organizational elements are absent. In many cases,
organizational elements are introduced in order to change or control
institutionalized orders or network relations.
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environmental, and governance criteria used in assigning
and claiming responsibility.
In the context of our interest in organizing CSR, the
most important dynamic can be summed up as a shift from
CSR principally being a more ‘‘corporate-centered’’ to a
more ‘‘corporate-oriented’’ concept (Moon 2014). Fifty
years ago, CSR would have been regarded by many as
essentially a matter of corporate discretion quite removed
from the requirements of the law or public policy (McGuire
1963). The corporation decided how its responsibility
would be enacted and that it was responsible for imple-
menting such decisions. As such, the organization of CSR
was almost entirely conducted through complete organi-
zation, i.e., the corporation. This is not to say that other
actors were entirely uninvolved in CSR. Community bod-
ies and charities who were recipients of CSR, which was
mainly in the form of philanthropy, would have played
some role in its organization. But relative to the subsequent
change in CSR, which we depict below, the organization of
CSR was ‘‘corporate-centered.’’
In contrast, CSR is now better conceptualized as a
‘‘corporate-oriented’’ phenomenon in which the focus is
upon responsibility in the sphere of the corporation,
including for its supply chain, for its own practices (e.g.,
employment, use of resources), and for the consumption
and disposal of its products and services. This broadening
of the conception of CSR from that defined by the corpo-
ration itself (i.e., usually philanthropic outputs) has been
associated with interest in responsibility in the sphere of
the corporation among a much wider set of actors,
including governments, civil society organizations, pro-
fessionals, and wider businesses. These actors tend to
organize their interest in CSR by what Ahrne and Brunsson
(2011) would call partial organization, ranging from setting
membership rules for partnerships to monitoring and
imposing sanctions on ir/responsible company behavior.
Today’s CSR still contains elements of complete organi-
zation. After all the corporations are deemed responsible
for actions in their name and take ‘‘explicit’’ responsibility
for these (Matten and Moon 2008). Moreover, there is
evidence that they are investing in their own CSR capacity.
This is evident in alignment of CSR with corporate aims
and strategy, dedicated CSR personnel and sub-organiza-
tional units, budgets, procedures (Moon 2004; see also
Bondy et al. 2012; Strand 2012). However, it is now also
organized by and with external actors such as other busi-
nesses (e.g., in an association such as Business in the
Community UK), governmental or civil society partners,
who bring new forms of organization, norms, incentives,
and roles (Moon 2004). This tension reflects the fact that
CSR is now as much about the social, governmental, and
multi-actor regulation of business as about self-regulation
of companies for community benefit.
Explanation of the changes in CSR from a more ‘‘cor-
porate-centered’’ to a more ‘‘corporate-oriented’’ concept,
which underpin the shift from complete organization for
CSR to the contemporary pattern in which more partial
organization is evolving, is difficult to pin down. It reflects
a lot of different actors into scope reflecting both an
increasing ‘‘socialization of markets’’ and changing forms
of ‘‘national and global governance’’ (Moon 2014). Our
point here is not the explanation but the recognition that in
such forms of CSR, the corporation is not the sole actor,
but operates with others who bring complementary
resources, including knowledge and legitimacy. Partial
organization for CSR not only involves partnerships (e.g.,
between NGOs and firms), CSR standards (e.g., the Global
Reporting Initiative), but also regulation through govern-
ment policies (e.g., for reporting environmental, social and
governance impacts; Gond et al. 2011). Such initiatives
frame the organization of CSR. Yet, these initiatives
organize CSR very differently from what would have been
expected of complete organization. Hence, it is useful to
unpack the difference between complete and partial orga-
nization for CSR in more detail.
Organizing CSR: Complete and Partial Organization
Organizing CSR Through Complete Organization
Those discussing what activities constitute CSR have often
looked inside formal organizations, in most cases MNCs
(Jamali et al. 2009). Looking at CSR within corporations
implies to focus on formal, ‘‘complete’’ organizations that
usually have access to all organizational elements,
although firms may use these elements to different degrees.
While research has not yet discussed the relationship
between the full range of organizational elements and CSR
in an integrated way, numerous studies have provided
insights into how selected elements impact the organization
of CSR within firms.
Corporations decide about membership determining who
is allowed to join the organization and who is excluded
(Ahrne 1994). Membership affects the identity of a cor-
poration and thus influences its understanding of CSR.
Corporate identity, understood as shared perceptions
leading to a certain degree of ‘‘perceived oneness with a
group’’ (Ashforth and Mael 1989, p. 35), can guide the
development of CSR activities that are congruent with how
managers view themselves and their organization. Basu
and Palazzo (2008), for instance, suggest that an organi-
zation’s identity orientation is likely to influence the kind
of relationships that it builds with stakeholders. Drawing
on Brickson’s (2007) work, they distinguish between an
individualistic orientation (emphasizing individual liberty
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and self-interest), a relational orientation (emphasizing
partnering with stakeholders), and a collectivistic orienta-
tion (emphasizing the role of organizations as part of
society at large). Who belongs to an organization (i.e., its
membership) has an influence on these orientations and
hence determines how an organization will organize its
CSR activities. For example, a firm with a relational
identity orientation is likely to emphasize CSR actions that
are based on building strong links with key stakeholders,
while a corporation with an individualistic orientation
might opt for activities that showcase its CSR performance
as ‘‘best in class’’ (Basu and Palazzo 2008).
Corporations organize for CSR by making reference to
some form of hierarchical steering. Hierarchy implies ‘‘a
right to oblige others to comply with central decisions.’’
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, p. 86) This right can be exer-
cised in formal and informal ways and by different indi-
viduals/groups within the organization. Hierarchy does not
necessarily imply that CSR is managed by using a com-
mand-and-control approach. Although CSR policies are
usually backed by central decisions and are mostly defined
by top-management (Singh 2011b), there are different
ways to ensure compliance with these decisions, including
the use of another organizational element, monitoring (see
below). For instance, managers can use transactional or
transformational leadership styles when organizing for
CSR (Burns 1979). Transactional leadership gives more
reference to formal power and rests on the belief that
leaders motivate through explicit rewards and receive
performance in return. Transformational leadership styles
are less focused on formal incentives and instead empha-
size individualized consideration, inspirational motivation,
and intellectual stimulation (Strand 2011). Hence, hierar-
chical steering can be exercised in different ways, espe-
cially when considering the diversity of leadership styles
for CSR (see also Pless et al. 2012).
Formal organizations also decide upon explicit rules that
members are expected to follow. According to Weber
(1968), rules provide for consistency, as decisions made in
one part of the organization can be executed in another
part. Corporations have given themselves rules that are
supposed to codify ‘‘what counts’’ as responsible behavior
in the context of the organization. These rules are usually
called ‘‘codes of conduct’’ (or ‘‘codes of ethics’’). Langlois
and Schlegelmilch (1990, p. 522) define such codes as ‘‘a
statement setting down corporate principles, ethics, rules of
conduct, codes of practice or company philosophy con-
cerning responsibility to employees, shareholders, con-
sumers, the environment, or any other aspects of society
external to the company.’’ The prevalence of such rules has
been increasing with 86 % of the Global Fortune 200
currently having their own code (Singh 2011a). Research
shows that the content and language of codes converge
across organizations, as there seems to be a ‘‘cut and paste’’
mentality (Holder-Webb and Cohen 2012) reflecting
coercive isomorphisms and mimetic practices (Matten and
Moon 2008). This raises the question of whether organi-
zations actually implement codes or whether code devel-
opment is a mere symbolic act. Stevens et al. (2005) find
that codes are integrated into decision-making when mar-
ket actors (e.g., shareholders) pressure firms to take a code
seriously and when it is integrated into routine activities
(e.g., via training programs). Of course, codes are just one
possible way to communicate expectations regarding
responsible behavior within a corporation. The rules
underlying CSR can also be fixed through other formal and
informal mechanisms (e.g., contracts and standard operat-
ing procedures).
Monitoring is often believed to be a necessary organi-
zational element to ensure code effectiveness (Petersen and
Krings 2009). Because legislation in some countries
requires firms to monitor the effectiveness of codes (e.g.,
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the U.S.; Kaptein and Schwartz
2008), there has been an increased emphasis on compliance
mechanisms in recent years. Singh (2011b), for instance,
finds that more than half of all Canadian firms use internal
audits to monitor compliance with their codes. However,
monitoring, when viewed as an organizational element, can
take many forms besides auditing. For example, code
enforcement often relies on a complaint-based system,
whereby peers or supervisors who observe misconduct can
file code violations (Beets and Killough 1990). Establish-
ing reporting and accounting systems (e.g., to track corrupt
behavior) can also create indirect monitoring effects, as
these systems enhance transparency around misconduct
and make it easier to govern individuals (Miller and
O’Leary 1987). Organizational members often internalize
the resulting pressures to comply with the provisions of a
code, making self-monitoring another way to improve code
effectiveness.
Most firms combine monitoring with sanctioning when
trying to enforce their codes. Existing research has largely
focused on negative sanctions, such as cessation of
employment, monetary fines, verbal warnings, and legal
actions (Singh 2011b). Of course, codes just contain a
promise of sanction, while it is unclear whether organiza-
tions really deliver on the promise (Weaver 1995). Even
when sanctions are not explicitly used as an organizational
element, it is possible that individuals will nevertheless
assume that sanctions exist. This is because people often
hold expectations based on their prior knowledge about the
general role of sanctions in organizations (Trevin˜o and Ball
1992). Hence, even the absence of this organizational
element can potentially support the organization of CSR,
arguably as long as the absence is not revealed. Con-
versely, organizations can bring positive sanctions in the
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form of individual rewards, including for meeting CSR
expectations.
Organizing CSR Through Partial Organization
Organizing for CSR has also happened to a large extent
outside and among formal organizations—i.e., by various
types of partial organization. We focus on two types of
partial organization in the CSR context: (a) CSR standards
and (b) cross-sector partnerships, as both have been part
and parcel of the discussion of CSR in recent years (see the
overviews by Austin and Seitanidi 2012 as well as Kourula
and Laasonen 2010). While much has been written about
both topics, surprisingly little research discusses the exis-
tence, absence and mixture of the above-mentioned orga-
nizational elements in the context of these types of partial
organization. In the following, we discuss CSR standards
and cross-sector partnerships and outline how both types of
partial organization use certain organizational elements and
disregard or are not able to employ others. We argue that
ignoring some organizational elements can be advanta-
geous for organizing CSR in specific circumstances making
partial organization a deliberate choice for organizers.
CSR Standards
Standards in their most general sense reflect ‘‘rule[s] for
common and voluntary use, decided by one or several
people or organizations.’’ (Brunsson et al. 2012, p. 616)
Over the last two decades, many such rules have emerged
in the CSR field, ranging from broadly defined principles
(e.g., the UN Global Compact) to more narrowly defined
certification standards (e.g., Social Accountability 8000)
and guidelines for reporting (e.g., the Global Reporting
Initiative). Recently, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) entered the CSR field by releasing
ISO 26000, a standard providing guidance on how different
types of organizations can operate in socially responsible
ways (Tamm Hallstro¨m 2008). Although CSR standards
differ in many ways and are designed for a variety of
purposes, they all reflect voluntary predefined rules for
assessing, measuring, and communicating social and
environmental performance (Rasche and Esser 2006).
Few CSR standards have restrictions regarding which
organizations can adopt their rules. While some sector-
specific initiatives are by definition limited to participants
from a certain industry, most standards are open in terms of
their membership. However, CSR standards differ with
regard to their membership strategies. Some standards
operate as ‘‘clubs’’ to which participants have to sign up in
order to become a member (Rasche 2012). For instance,
organizations have to sign up to the Fair Labor Association
to reap the benefits of membership. Companies also submit
for consideration by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.
This makes these standards an excludable good (Prakash
and Potoski 2006). Such a ‘‘closed’’ membership strategy
can have positive social identity effects, as members feel
part of a (more or less) exclusive club working toward a
common purpose (Brewer 1993). Where companies derive
reputational advantage from being members of standards,
they will occasionally seek to protect this by excluding
members who they consider to be temporarily falling short
of the standard’s requirements (e.g., Primark and the Eth-
ical Trading Initiative). Other standards have decided to
deliberately ignore membership as an organizational ele-
ment. For instance, firms cannot sign up to become part of
ISO 26000 or the Global Reporting Initiative (although
firms can register their reports). In contrast to the Dow
Jones example (above), the FTSE4Good Index, while
restricted to the pool of listed companies, evaluates all in
this pool and listing is not based on application but on
monitoring (Slager et al. 2012). Ignoring membership as an
organizational element can be advantageous, as it lowers
entry barriers and hence can positively influence adoption
rates. The swift growth of the Global Reporting Initiative
into the de facto standard for non-financial reporting is a
case in point (Etzion and Ferraro 2010).
As CSR standards are by definition voluntary, they are
not based on forced obligations to comply with their
underlying rules. In this sense, CSR standards do not
depend on hierarchy as an instrument of organizing; they
emphasize compliance rather than coercion. The organi-
zation adopting the standard has the main responsibility for
insuring that the rules are followed, while in the context of
law the responsibility for enforcement lies primarily with
the rule setter (i.e., the state). This delegation of imple-
mentation authority to standard followers is often consid-
ered to be a key characteristic of soft law (Abbott et al.
2000). The absence of the right to force others into stan-
dard adoption is a mixed blessing for CSR standards. On
the one hand, it allows for higher degrees of contextual-
ization and flexibility, as the complier usually makes the
final decision about how to fit the rules of the standard into
the particular organizational context (Ahrne and Brunsson
2011). On the other hand, this flexibility can also be mis-
used leading to accusations of standard adopters not
walking their talk (Behnam and MacLean 2011).
While CSR-related rules within formal organizations
tend to be very specific, since they need to account for the
circumstances of a particular organizational context, the
rules underlying CSR standards are often less precise,
because they are supposed to be universally valid. Many
standards address problems that cut across nation states and
thus promote rules that are applicable in different geo-
graphic contexts, often taking existing international treaties
or declarations as a point of reference (Leipziger 2003).
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For instance, the rules promoted by the FLA are based on
universally recognized conventions by the International
Labor Organization (ILO). Such universal rules offer a
two-edged sword, however. One the one hand, they enable
responsible behavior on a global scale and hence level the
playing field. On the other hand, generalized rules always
call for further contextualization within the process of
application (Ortmann 2010).
Numerous standards ignore monitoring and sanctioning
as organizational elements. For instance, ISO 26000
highlights that the standard is non-certifiable and thus does
not contain any monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms
(ISO 2010). While the decision to abstain from monitoring
and sanctioning is often a political one, also depending on
the nature of the standard itself (Rasche 2010, 2009), some
standard setters can achieve high levels of compliance
because they are themselves considered legitimate actors,
making it risky for adopters to violate the standard. Stan-
dard setters often weigh the costs associated with adding
further organizational elements like monitoring/sanction-
ing and the associated benefits, particularly when consid-
ering that monitoring itself cannot always guarantee higher
compliance levels (e.g., because of sloppy audit practices;
O’Rourke 2002). Even those standards that are explicitly
set up to audit factories often outsource monitoring and
sanctioning to other organizations. Social Accountability
8000, for instance, relies on professional certification
bodies to carry out the audits (Gilbert and Rasche 2007).
Since monitoring is a costly and time-consuming practice,
this division of labor creates many advantages, as different
organizers apply complementary organizational elements.
However, some standards rely upon monitoring and the
sanction of inclusion/exclusion, as in the case of the
FTSE4Good which has neither membership nor hierarchy
(Slager et al. 2012). Monitoring and sanctioning are not
necessarily bound together. There can be monitoring
without explicit sanctioning, such as when relying on
implicit sanctions through reputation mechanisms.
Cross-sector Partnerships
Partial organization for CSR can also happen through
cross-sector partnerships. Many definitions are available of
such partnerships and closely related concepts (Googins
and Rochlin 2000; Seitanidi and Crane 2009; Selsky and
Parker 2005). One general definition of partnerships in a
CSR context is ‘‘collaborative arrangements in which
actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market,
and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical pro-
cess, and through which these actors strive for a sustain-
ability goal.’’ (van Huijstee et al. 2007, p. 77) Cross-sector
approaches to CSR have in common that they involve
collaborative efforts across business, government, and civil
society but they, just like standards, come in many different
forms. As van Huijstee et al. (2007) note in their review,
partnerships are attributed a lot of different roles in the
literature, from agenda setting to policy development and
implementation, or from market creation to dissemination
of knowledge.
First, we should reflect on the notion of membership. To
engage in a partnership, at least two partners are required
but not every organization can become a partner and not
every collaboration results in a partnership. According to
Googins and Rochlin (2000), important elements in creat-
ing mutually beneficial relationships include clear goals,
senior level commitment, frequent communication,
involvement of professionals, a shared commitment of
resources, and an evaluation of progress. Quite a few
publications present stage models to describe the devel-
opment of partnerships, often from selection to design and
institutionalization (Selsky and Parker 2005), but calls are
also issued to conduct more micro-based studies to unpack
these different stages (Seitanidi and Crane 2009). Such an
approach can contribute to understanding the way mem-
bership varies in partnerships across sectors and why this
variation would be beneficial for (one of) the partners.
As the definition of van Huijstee et al. (2007) already
emphasized, cross-sector partnerships usually are non-
hierarchical forms of organizing. Although hierarchies
may not be fully absent they are less evident in partnerships
which put more emphasis on consensus-based decisions.
Where governments are members of partnerships, their
hierarchical position is usually parenthetical to the opera-
tion of the partnership (e.g., the UK CSR Academy),
whereas their imprimatur, and fiscal and organizational
resources are more central (Moon and Vogel 2008). Yet,
although formal hierarchies are less present in partnerships,
there often are power differences among partners that
affect, for instance, the availability of information or the
influence in negotiation processes. Some authors, for
instance, argue that ‘‘[t]he successful development of
supply chain partnerships for sustainability tends to involve
[…] a high concentration of powerful agents and the
marginalization of smaller and less powerful agents.’’
(Nikoloyuk et al. 2010, p. 70)
Rules are relevant in partnerships in several ways. On
the one hand, there are internal rules, governing the part-
nership and defining, for instance, membership. Although
some formal rules can exist, often there are no clear
guidelines available on how to operate within a partnership.
Babiak and Thibault (2008), for instance, note that in cross-
sector partnerships performance measures often are
unclear. This absence of clarity allows for flexibility but
could also backfire when one partner gets dissatisfied and
decides to abandon the partnership. Egels-Zande´n and
Wahlqvist (2006, p. 176) speak of post-partnership
Complete and Partial Organizing for CSR 657
123
strategies in this respect, deployed by firms that ‘‘seem to
have grown tired of what are, in their eyes, inefficient and
unproductive cross-sectoral partnerships.’’ On the other
hand, there are more external rules that are relevant for
partnerships, for instance when these rules are the result of
negotiations with NGOs on self-regulation (Pattberg 2005).
The establishment of self-regulation in interaction with the
wider environment involves elements of organizing but
often also requires a lack of hierarchy to establish a level
playing field for participating in the development process.
Roundtables are one way to establish such self-regulation,
as participants can be considered to be more or less equal
such as in the Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)
(Nikoloyuk et al. 2010).
Having rules available, and mutually agreed upon, is one
thing but enforcing them is another. This leads to the
notions of monitoring and sanctioning. ‘‘If a partnership is
organized only with membership and rules, it will be up to
the members themselves to monitor and sanction each
other. Some members may reduce their cooperation with
another member if they learn that this member does not
follow the rules.’’ (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011 p. 94) One
element often discussed in terms of monitoring is how to
determine the value creating ability of partnerships. All
participants in a partnership must have an idea of how their
participation is going to generate value for them (Googins
and Rochlin 2000). Yet, determining such value and thus
monitoring the effectiveness of a partnership is not an easy
task. As Austin and Seitanidi (2012) indicate, in different
partnerships different measures are applied, arguably
because these measures fit best with the particular partners’
objectives. The fact that different measures can be applied
in monitoring gives partners a considerable degree of
freedom in emphasizing one issue over another, as long as
the partners involved all agree.
In addition, partners will also closely monitor the results
of their fellow partners to see whether every participant is
living up to the expectations. Accountability, measurable
targets and timetables, and reporting and monitoring
mechanisms hence are listed as important elements for
successfully organizing partnerships (Ba¨ckstrand 2006).
According to Ba¨ckstrand (2006, p. 303): ‘‘Plural forms of
accountability are needed to match the plural and amor-
phous features of global multi-sectoral partnerships.’’ She
speaks of ‘‘horizontal accountability (market, reputational
and peer accountability)’’ and notes that ‘‘this fits the
flexible and decentralized features of partnerships.’’
(Ba¨ckstrand 2006, p. 300) Such a flexible character of
monitoring complicates the final element of organization,
sanctioning, as the outcomes of monitoring usually form
the reason to sanction. Meanwhile, the way partnerships
are constructed often includes only limited sanctioning
power for its participants. As Glasbergen (2011, p. 7)
notes: ‘‘sanctions for failing to comply are often restricted
to expulsion from the partnership.’’ Although such a
strategy seems to be a fairly weak sanction, being expelled
from a partnership might have serious consequences in
terms of reputation and credibility (Glasbergen 2011). Yet,
one could question how easily such a sanction is applied
and what alternatives are available to correct fellow
partners.
New Research Directions: Organizing for CSR
Bearing these thoughts on complete and partial organiza-
tion in mind, we now introduce the papers of this Special
Issue and discuss their contributions. They can be grouped
into three categories: papers discussing communication and
the organization of CSR, papers reflecting on the context of
organizing CSR, and papers concerned with the role of
activists in the organization of CSR.
Two papers emphasize how communication affects
organizing for CSR. Brennan et al. (2013) conceptualize
CSR communication as a process of reciprocal influence
between organizations and their audiences. Based on
insights from linguistics they focus on different aspects of
dialogism to examine the nature and type of verbal interac-
tions between different parties in a conflict. They argue that
CSR communication is an interactive process that has to be
understood as a function of the power relations between a
firm and a specific stakeholder. Related to this approach,
Schultz et al. (2013) build on the communication constitutes
organization (CCO) perspective (e.g., Christensen and
Cornelissen 2011) to view CSR as communicatively con-
structed in dynamic interaction processes in networked
societies. They discuss the potentially indeterminate, disin-
tegrative, and conflictual character of CSR and challenge
established views on CSR for not sufficiently acknowledging
communication dynamics. They contend that this leads to a
variety of biases and discuss implications of these biases.
With their emphasis on communication as a central
element in organizing CSR, both papers touch on partial
organization. Viewing CSR as constructed through com-
munication and highlighting the role of dialogism and
interaction processes implies a focus on power relations
and conflict. The interaction process is not organized
completely and therefore leaves room for discretion and
adjustment. It is the contested area not fully organized that
leaves room for debate, for dissent and for alternative
interpretations. In emphasizing the importance of concep-
tualizing CSR communication as dialogical and interactive,
such work can provide new insights on the process of
institutionalizing CSR practices.
Two papers address contextual features affecting how
CSR is organized. Baumann-Pauly et al. (2013) study how
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firm size affects the organization of CSR. Based on a com-
parative study of Swiss MNCs and SMEs, they argue that
small firms possess several organizational characteristics
that promote the implementation of CSR-related practices in
core business functions, but, at the same time, constrain
external communication and reporting. By contrast, MNCs
possess characteristics that are favorable for promoting
external communication and reporting, but, at the same time,
constrain internal implementation. Gond and Boxenbaum
(2013) study how responsible investment practices were
imported in two different geographical regions and were
adapted to these local settings. They show how actors
employed three types of contextualization work (filtering,
repurposing, and coupling) in both geographical settings to
overcome the lack of technical, cultural, or political fit
between the imported practice and their local context.
Whereas the paper by Baumann-Pauly et al. (2013)
focuses on complete organization to learn how differences
in formal organizations lead to different ways of organizing
CSR, the paper by Gond and Boxenbaum (2013) clearly
takes a partial organization perspective as it highlights how
different actors try to adapt practices to a local context,
requiring them to deviate from standards and to engage in
deliberate engineering practices. The paper by Baumann-
Pauly et al. (2013) is the most focused on complete orga-
nization, providing a comparative study to examine how
different forms of organization play out in different con-
texts. This demonstrates how a systematic comparison
between organizations based on their formal organizational
elements can lead to useful insights on the organization of
CSR. Gond and Boxenbaum (2013) focus on the explicit
use of partial organizing, highlighting how this creates
room for contextualizations. The more ‘‘completely’’ the
responsible investment practices are organized, the less
room they leave for local flavoring and adaptation.
The final three papers examine interactions between
firms and civil society organizations. Arenas et al. (2013)
suggest that it is important to examine the role of third
parties in understanding collaboration between firms and
civil society organizations. They analyze the presence of
third parties and their different roles to explain how col-
laboration is facilitated. Burchell and Cook (2013) examine
the theoretical implications of the changing relationships
between NGOs and businesses that have emerged as a
response to the evolving agenda around CSR and sustain-
able development. They do so by focusing on a process of
appropriation and co-optation of protest by the business
community. In identifying an alternative approach, they
build on Chantal Mouffe’s (1999) work to illustrate the
way in which agonistic relationships are emerging between
NGOs and businesses. Finally, Whelan (2013) introduces
the notion of ‘‘dissensual CSR’’ to examine how this type
of CSR is concerned with organizing corporate-civil
society disagreement. Building on institutional theory and
highlighting an economic perspective, he analyses a dissent
enabling public sphere that Shell has constructed, and
within which Greenpeace participated.
These three papers focus on the relationship between
civil society and firms. Whereas Arenas et al. (2013) stress
the importance of overcoming the dichotomy between
collaboration and confrontation, the other two papers take a
more critical stance, emphasizing the importance of con-
flict and dissensus. Burchell and Cook (2013), for instance,
argue for a perspective on engagement reaching beyond an
understanding of CSR as co-optation. Although research
increasingly stresses the importance of collaboration,
increasingly more critical approaches of CSR appear
(Banerjee 2008; Levy 2008). Regardless of the ideological
position, this stream of research indicates how the position
of civil society toward firms remains an issue for debate.
The three papers together provide insight into potential
criticism of partial organization for CSR.
Toward a Future Research Agenda
Our paper connects recent work on the nature of organizing
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2011) to the study of CSR. The
presence of five organizational elements (membership,
hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctions) defines com-
plete organization, while partial organization involves the
absence of one or more of these elements. We maintain that
it is useful to analytically distinguish different modes of
organizing for CSR along the dimension of complete-par-
tial organization. We suggest that a general shift from
almost exclusive complete organization of CSR to a mixed
picture with much more partial organization is a crucial
feature of the more general trends of CSR from being
‘‘corporate-centered’’ to more ‘‘corporate-oriented’’, and
the increasing institutionalization of CSR not only within
business but also among non-governmental, governmental,
and professional actors.
Adding the idea of partial organization allows CSR
scholars to explore the division of labor between different
organizers such as standard setters, consultants, or auditors.
Ignoring certain organizational elements can provide
organizers with much-needed room for maneuvering which
allows the actors involved to look for common ground.
Less complete forms of organizing are less formal and
therefore sometimes easier to promote among, for instance,
potential partners (who may be erstwhile adversaries) in
partnerships. This adds to approaches in the literature that
present the organization of CSR as a political process
where new, and potentially less organized, forms of gov-
ernance are proposed (Moon et al. 2004; Fransen 2012;
Pattberg 2005).
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This view on organizing connects with institutional
theory, which is applied widely in the CSR field to
understand how different actors influence processes of
institutional change. Interaction processes between actors
often take time before they result in institutional change, if
they do so at all. Organization can be expected to reflect a
quicker method for creating change than trying to influence
institutions directly (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, p. 96). For
instance, those aiming at changing institutionalized prac-
tices like non-financial reporting rarely have the time to
wait for processes of socialization to change taken-for-
granted behavior. Rather, they try to influence existing
practices by introducing partial organization (e.g., stan-
dards). Recent attempts to change traditional ‘‘sustain-
ability reporting’’ into ‘‘integrated reporting’’ via a new
standard, the International Integrated Reporting Frame-
work, is a case in point. Understood in this way, it is
possible to organize institutions and hence introduce a
certain level of control over them—the study by Gond and
Boxenbaum (2013) provides an example of such institu-
tional work, but more research is needed to unpack these
processes.
These considerations point at several directions for
future research. First of all, the relationship between
complete and partial organization and processes of insti-
tutionalization requires further work. Why are certain
organizational forms used more frequently to institution-
alize CSR activities, while other forms are less wide-
spread? Studies could focus on the role of specific elements
of organizing and their role in processes of institutionali-
zation: how do rules or sanctions guide the institutionali-
zation of norms and standards in CSR and, specifically,
how necessary is the presence of all five elements of
organization? Could successful institutionalization occur
without, say, membership or hierarchy? Future research
needs to clarify how the presence or absence of organiza-
tional elements facilitates or hampers the institutionaliza-
tion of CSR practices.
Second, future scholarly work can examine in what
ways the conduct of CSR influences selected organiza-
tional elements. While the arguments presented in this
paper show how the use and mix of different organizational
elements influence the way CSR is organized, it is also
possible to examine how CSR practices change these ele-
ments over time. For instance, firms with well-developed
CSR practices often attract a special kind of workforce
changing the membership of the organization. This
emphasizes that the relationship between organizing and
CSR is not linear but recursive.
Third, research needs to further examine the role of non-
business actors in processes of organizing for CSR. NGOs
or other civil society organizations are often able to stim-
ulate CSR initiatives. However, these tactics are usually
not studied from the perspective of partial organization;
Haug’s (2013) recent paper is one exception. Focusing on a
partial organization perspective could contribute to a more
detailed understanding of how tactics for influencing
organizations work and how interaction processes between
firms and activists unfold when not all formal organiza-
tional elements are present.
Fourth, future research should highlight the dynamics of
organizing for CSR. For instance, the types of partial
organization, which are used to address social and envi-
ronmental issues, change over time (e.g., the Marine
Stewardship Council started out as a partnership between
WWF and Unilever and then turned into a standard). Why
do organizers move from one type of partial organization to
another? What influences the adoption of certain types of
partial organization over time? And in what ways does the
movement of a social or environmental topic along the
issue life cycle influence types of organizing?
Although we do not argue that the five organizational
elements discussed in this paper represent a conclusive list,
they provide a meaningful point of departure to discuss the
relevance of organization in the context of CSR. Taking an
alternative view on the role of organization within CSR
leads to a different take on how corporate responsibilities
are formed and how they influence a firm. With this paper
we have only started to unpack the questions associated
with this organization-focused approach to CSR; we look
forward to reading further empirical studies in this
direction.
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